A few days ago I happened upon an article about Littler Mendelson, P.C.  They are a large employment law defense firm and have offices in every major metropolitan area of California.  I would bet that if I looked at all of the cases our firm has handled over the years, Littler is the firm we are most often pitted against.

Except for a few bad experiences (every company has some bad apples and law firms are no exception), I have found most opposing counsel at Littler to be professional and relatively pleasant to deal with under the circumstances.

You will not often hear me singing the "enemy's" praises, but Littler recently received a perfect score (100) on the 2009 Corporate Equality Index.  This rating is given each year by the Human Rights Campaign Foundation, which is an advocacy group for gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered ("GLBT") Americans.

I find it refreshing that a law firm dedicated to defending employers who have been accused of violating their employees' rights has taken the steps necessary to discourage discrimination "at home".

Employment defense counsel are always "talking the talk" to me about how their clients are committed to diversity, non-discrimination, etc. and would have "never" done what we are accusing them doing.

It looks as though Littler actually "walks the walk" (even if their clients do not always follow their example).  Congrats on a job well done.

This is our third post in our series on "family status" discrimination. The last post dealt with examples of "moral stereotyping" where an employer's belief on what women should do motivates their discrimination. This post deals with what I call "assumption" stereotyping, which deals with instances where an employer is motivated by their beliefs about what women will do, given their family status.

In these situations, the employer's concerns about how an employee or job applicant's home life could affect their job performance are often valid in theory, but not in application. In cases such as these the employer only assumes that the employee will not be willing or able to do the job and has no reason (other than stereotypical views of women) to make their assumptions.

One common example is where an applicant is not hired because the employer assumes she will not be willing or able to work the long hours the job requires because of her (assumed) duties at home. However, it is quite possible that the husband/father or another family member has taken on some of the childcare duties to allow her to work more. Because this decision relies on the employer's stereotypical assumptions about women, this could constitute illegal discrimination.

It is true that it might be valid in certain cases not to hire an employee because she cannot perform the job due to family responsibilities, but the employer would have to have some actual proof on which to base their decision. For example, if during the interview the employer mentioned the job would require her to work no less than 80 hours per week and the applicant responded that she could not possibly work more than 40 hours with two kids at home, then this could be a valid reason not to hire her.

One oft-cited case of this type is Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., 1998 WL 912101 (S.D.N.Y.). In that case, an attorney was not even considered for a promotion because it would have required extensive travel. Her employers simply assumed that she would not be interested in the position because of her family and promoted a less-qualified man instead.

The employee was also told that once her husband made enough money she would be "sitting at home eating bon bons" and the company's vice president commented on the "incompetence and laziness of working mothers".

This is my second post in our multi-part series on "family status" discrimination, which is becoming more and more common under both federal and state law.

There are many ways family status discrimination can happen in the workplace, some of which are very subtle and difficult to prove. Other types are not subtle at all, such as the topic of today's post, which is what I call "Moral Stereotyping".

Moral Stereotyping Defined

Generally in family status discrimination claims the employer is largely concerned about how the employee's caregiver responsibilities affect them, such as increased absences, less dedication to the job, less focus, unreliability, etc. However. one of the unique aspects of moral stereotyping is that the employer is often more concerned about the well-being of the employee, her child her family or other paternalistic rationale.

Yes, it is true that even in 2008 there are many employers out there who still believe a woman "belongs" at home and that their primary duty is to raise children even to take care of their husband. In these situations, employers might even terminate an employee (to their own detriment) in an effort to force the employee to do what they believe is "right".

Some commonly-cited motivations based on this theory are discussed below.

"Women Belong at Home"

The notion that a woman simply "belongs at home" is the most common way in which these issues are expressed by management. This is a prime example of the sorts of gender stereotypes that foster discrimination against these employees.

The motivation here is not necessarily what is best for the employee or her child, but instead what the employer thinks she "should" do based on traditional gender roles. These employers think that even if the wife makes twice as much as her husband, she should quit her job to raise the children.

A more poignant way of expressing this can be found in Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2001), where the employee was simply told "God made women to have babies". Speaking of God, several employers do cite their religious views as a basis for this discrimination, which exposes the employer to an additional claim for religious discrimination.

"Children Need Their Mothers"

The traditional notion that children must spend as much time as possible with their mothers is certainly ingrained in our society. This category of cases usually involves an employer who believes they know what is best for the child and believes they are acting in the child's best interest when they terminate or failure to hire the employee.

For example, in Moore v. Alabama State University, 980 F.Supp. 426 (MD Ala 1997), the employee's supervisor told her he believed women should stay at home with their family and denied her a promotion because the new job would involve too much travel for a "married mother", despite the fact that she applied for the job and had already worked out a plan with her husband to accommodate the travel.

Moral stereotyping is not limited to male management employees. Often these issues can come into play when an employee's female supervisor either has grown children or grandchildren and holds strong views on these issues they are not afraid to make known.

A variation on this theme is where an employee's supervisor expresses their belief that placing a child in day care is harmful to their development.

Men are the Breadwinners

Gender stereotypes are also commonly used against men. It is no longer unusual for a husband to drop down to part-time when a child is born while his wife, who might make more money than he does, continues to work full-time.

In certain testosterone-fueled workplaces, this can lead to harassment of "Mr. Mom" by co-workers or he might simply be denied the opportunity to work part-time, even though females are allowed to do so.

This type of claim is rapidly becoming more common as working mothers continue to enter the workplace and men volunteer to help with caregiver duties.

"Reverse" Caregiver Discrimination

Occasionally I come across a case where an employee has suffered "reverse" caregiver discrimination.

For example, if a layoff occurs in a company and a supervisor decides to terminate an above-average, single male employee and instead keep the below-average, married father of two.

In California, this more of an example of "marital status" discrimination, which is specifically prohibited under California law, but these facts could also constitute family status discrimination.

I use this example here because the supervisor is simply applying his own stereotypes and morals to "protect" the man with a family based on his own morals and values instead of what is "fair" to the better-performing employee or what is in the company's best interest.

Bringing Moral Stereotyping Cases

Moral stereotyping cases tend to be the most lucrative and easiest to prove among the various types of caregiver discrimination for a number of reasons.

First, they often involve the most inflammatory evidence that is offensive to the highest number of potential jurors. If a supervisor testifies to his belief that "God made women to have babies" and that this belief was why he did not hire the plaintiff, you can bet that many on the jury may be quite hostile towards the company when awarding the plaintiff damages.

Second, the supervisor who takes the wrongful actions against a plaintiff in such as case is often quite vocal about their motivations when they terminate or refuse to hire because (1) they truly believe they are doing the "right" thing, (2) they want the employee to know that this is the "right" thing and (3) it never crosses their mind that they are handing the employee a substantial lawsuit by "lecturing" them.

One employment law claim that has been quickly becoming more popular these days is "family status discrimination". That is, discriminating against someone based on their familial obligations or simply because they have a family in the first place.

Widespread use of this claim is so recent that it does not even have a consistent name in legal circles. We call it "family status discrimination", but others call it "family responsibilities discrimination", "FSD" or "FRD" for short, "caregiver discrimination" and countless other names, but they are all the same idea.

This post is the first in a series on the subject which is fairly expansive, quite interesting and can also get confusing.

The Impetus

The reason I bring this subject up now is because I just started a case representing two women against the same former employer who violated almost all of the various family status discrimination theories in dealing with one or both of them.

It is a very interesting case for several reasons, not the least of which is the ironic twist that the employer is an organization that actively promotes equality for women and the building of strong families as its mission.

While settlement discussions are under way, I cannot speak too much about this case in particular, but if it does end up in litigation I will post more details such as the identity of the employer.

The Legal Basis

I should first point out that the term "family status" is not mentioned anywhere in federal or California employment law statutes.

Instead, these claims are based on other existing employment laws, such as gender, marital status or pregnancy discrimination. The Family Medical Leave Act, California Family Rights Act, Pregnancy Disability Leave and other statutes also come into play.

Family status discrimination is one of those areas where employee-rights attorneys are very "creative" in crafting their legal theories. New ways of approaching the claims are constantly being tested in courts across the country and often prevailing.

This series is meant to be an exploration of these various theories and how they can be used under California law to protect employees.

A timely study by the Institute for Corporate Productivity (i4cp) that was released on Tuesday finds that the vast majority of corporations have some sort of formal anti-discrimination policy.

However, failure to adequately communicate such policies is a frequent problem, where only 80% of those companies rate anti-discrimination training "either somewhat or very important".

This study is certainly timely in the debate over Tribune company's hopelessly inadequate anti-harassment policy. Training employees using such a policy might actually have a negative effect, since it does not even recognize creation of a hostile work environment as illegal harassment.

Let me first say that I rarely disagree with decisions by California state or federal appellate courts (at least those I am not personally involved in and therefore biased towards). However, I occasionally come across a case where I just think the court got it wrong.

In Mokler v. County of Orange, et.al. (Cal.App.Dist.4 11/26/2007), No. G036029, a former Orange County employee sued under several different claims, including sexual harassment of her by a county supervisor. While I agree with the court's decision on most of the issues presented by the case, I do disagree on their sexual harassment analysis and decision.

The Facts of the Case

Without going into too much detail, Ms. Mokler had to interact with Orange County Supervisors "on almost a daily basis" as part of her job duties, including Supervisor Chris Norby. Mokler introduced herself to Norby at a budget hearing in 2003 and he promptly asked her if she was married. When she said no, he called her an "aging nun". Mokler reported the incident to her supervisor, but he did nothing about it and actually told Mokler to "be careful".

Mokler next encountered Norby at a hotel where a political event was being held. Norby took her arm, pressed her body up against his and said "in a flirtatious manner: 'Did you come here to lobby me?'" Mokler responded that she was not there to lobby him and he asked "Why not? These women are lobbying me," gesturing to two women standing next to him. Norby continued to hold her body up against his, looked her up and down, and told her she had "a nice suit and nice legs". Mokler was finally able to push her self away from him and again went to her supervisor who again told her to "be careful" and further suggested she "needed 'to win him over'".

Mokler's final encounter with Norby occurred in his office. When she arrived, he put his arm around her and told her she looked "nice". He walked over to a large map on the wall and asked her where she lived. When she hesitated, he "demanded she provide her exact address." He put his arm around Mokler again and rubbed her breast with his arm until she pushed herself away from him and apparently a male co-worker interrupted them.

The Trial Court's Decision

The jury found in Mokler's favor on her sexual harassment claim against Norby, but awarded no damages to her for the claim. While uncommon, this does occur where an employee suffers no economic damages as a direct result of the harassment and they are unable to prove any emotional distress or other special damages. However, the trial court ultimately "entered judgment on this claim against Norby, but nonetheless declared him the 'prevailing party' and awarded costs in his favor."

In California sexual harassment cases, the "prevailing party" is entitled to attorney's fees and costs, but I am still scratching my head on how Norby had a judgment entered against him and is still considered to have "prevailed".

The only reason for this I can come up with is that there as an offer made under California Code of Civil Procedure 998.  Under that statute, if a party offers to settle for a set amount, the offer is rejected, and then the other party gets less than was originally offered to them, the opposing party can get their costs reimbursed.  However, this is not mentioned anywhere in the opinion and there are several reasons why even this does not make sense as a reason.  But this is not the point of the post, so I will let it go...

The County appealed several of the trial court's rulings, including the finding of sexual harassment by Norby for creating a "hostile work environment".

The Appellate Court's Decision

The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision, finding that no hostile work environment was created by Norby. The court ruled that Norby's conduct was not "severe or pervasive" enough to justify the trial court's finding that sexual harassment occurred.

It is extremely rare to find a case where both the jury and the trial court found that sexual harassment occurred and the appellate court reverses that decision. In almost all cases that are reversed like this, it is usually very clear that sexual harassment did not occur and the jury got it wrong. I would submit to you that in this case the jury was right and the appellate court was in error.

The appellate court based its decision on a number of factors, including their findings that the incidents "involved no physical threats," "the touching...was brief and did not constitute an extreme act of harassment," and the demand for her address was "brazen," but "[did not create]...a hostile work environment."

To me, if a manager rubs a subordinate's breast, this does constitute "an extreme act of harassment". This is sexual assault, plain and simple, which is punishable as a crime in California! How this conduct could ever not qualify as "severe" or "extreme" is beyond me. Further,holding her body up against his and telling her she has nice legs also borders on extreme.

The court suggests that no "physical threats" occurred. However, when a supervisor grabs an employee's breast after demanding to know where she lives and getting no response, to me this certainly does qualify as a "physical threat".

Additionally, while it is unclear whether Mokler brought her sexual harassment claim against just Norby or against Orange County as well, I believe the county should have liability here. When Mokler complained to her supervisor about Norby's conduct, he simply told her to "be careful" and that she "needed to win him over." I do not know whether these remarks were intended to suggest that she go along with Norby's behavior or if this was a veiled threat against her for complaining, but the way the court's opinion reads it seems the county did absolutely nothing to stop Norby's conduct and possibly tried to stop her from bringing it up.

This is simply one man's opinion, but I call them like I see them and to me this case was decided incorrectly by the appellate court. I do not know if Mokler plans to file an appeal, but I would be very interested to see what the California Supreme Court would decide after reviewing the case.

Employers could avoid a LOT of lawsuits if they would just follow the "No Bad Apples Rule", which has its origins in a book written by Dr. Robert Sutton called "The No Asshole Rule: Building a Civilized Workplace and Surviving One That Isn't". Although I agree with Dr. Sutton that "bad apples" probably is not a strong enough word, to be politically correct I will use this less offensive term.

The basic premise of this rule is that employers refuse to allow employees who are disruptive, excessively arrogant, rude or downright mean to work in their company. Often these employees are kept around because they are the top salesperson in the office or some other performance-based reason.

However, the book focuses on the reality that no matter how productive these employees are, it is usually not worth keeping them around when you consider the havoc they wreak on workplace morale, the performance of others and the potential for lawsuits against the employer later on.

It is very common when talking to prospective clients that they actually loved their job before Mr. X was hired and turned the office into a combat zone. Regarding their manager's reaction to these problem employees, these clients often tell me things like "my supervisor ignored it" or "my manager was oblivious to it".

An employer is especially in trouble if the a--hole is white (or male, young, straight, etc.) and those complaining are black (or female, older, gay, etc.). In California, this is usually enough for the employee to bring a "hostile work environment" harassment claim and often prevail.

If employers would simply communicate more with their employees, be cognizant of sharp drops in morale, and do something about these problem employees when they are discovered, they could avoid an awful lot of lawsuits by jaded and disgruntled employees.

Special thanks to the Workplace Fairness blog, where I first discovered this book.

Additionally, Diane Levine mentions a study at her Online Guide to Mediation blog, that comes to a similar conclusion about "bad apples".

Q: One of my co-workers has asked me to testify for in her discrimination case against our employer. I want to help, but I am afraid that my employer will retaliate against me if I help her.

--Want to Help But Scared (CA)

A: Both state and federal discrimination laws prohibit retaliation by employers against employees for participating in an investigation or prosecution of an employment discrimination or harassment case.

Investigation Outcome Irrelevant

Even if it turns out that the employee who complains about discrimination was not discriminated against, or even if that employee turns out to be lying, you are still protected from retaliation.

The law protects the act of speaking up for someone else, which is evaluated independently of the underlying discrimination claim.

Retaliation Can Be Subtle

This year's landmark Supreme Court case of Burlington Northern v. White, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (2006), clarified and strengthened protections for employees against retaliation in discrimination cases.

The Court decided that any actions by an employer that would "dissuade" a "reasonable employee" from making or supporting a discrimination complaint is illegal retaliation and proper grounds for that employee to sue.

What this boils down to is that if you are retaliated against and in hindsight you would not have participated in the investigation if you had known what your employer would later do to you for it, then those actions are likely illegal.

Co-Worker Assistance is Crucial

One of the major motivations for the Court in the Burlington case was the strong public policy in this country to encourage those employees who witness discrimination against others to speak up and testify if needed.

It is important for these witnesses to feel comfortable testifying against their employers on other employees' behalf if there was wrongdoing.

Q: My boss is a real jerk. She harasses me for no good reason, calls me names and belittles me in front of other employees. Today I finally told her not to treat me like that anymore, because it interferes with my work and it is unprofessional. She fired me on the spot for complaining. Please tell me this is not legal in California!

-- A Woman Wronged (CA)

A: You are in luck. In California it is illegal under Labor Code § 232.5 to retaliate against an employee for complaining about "working conditions".

Unfortunately, the term "working conditions" has not been clearly defined by California Courts under this statute. For example, if an employee complains about the poor selection in the break room's vending machine and is terminated for the complaint, the language of the statute suggests that this would be illegal.

I actually believe that this example would be illegal. However, the employee would have to prove that their employer actually terminated them for complaining about the vending machine. The less believable it is that an employer would terminate an employee for a complaint, the less likely a judge or jury would be to decide the complaint actually triggered the termination.

However, your situation is almost certainly covered by the statute. If your complaint about how your boss treated you is really what motivated her to terminate you, then you would likely be able to pursue a wrongful termination case against your former employer.

Under such a claim you might be able to recover all of your lost wages, attorney's fees and certain penalties.